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making objective was the type of
referral sales program the Iowa
legislature wanted to prohibit.
Santa Rosa's Misrepresentations
The court then turned to the
issue of misrepresentation of po-
tential earnings and the program's
legality. Santa Rosa admitted that
certain brokers misrepresented the
dollar amounts purchasers could
earn. However, Santa Rosa argued
that it was not responsible, because
"renegade brokers" made the mis-
representations. The supreme
court disagreed for two reasons.
First, broker training materials
contained assurances of quick and
easy money. Second, Santa Rosa
failed to develop a system to moni-
tor either the new brokers or their
training. Therefore, the supreme
court held that Santa Rosa could
not disclaim responsibility for the
misrepresentations of its brokers.
Santa Rosa also admitted that
its brokers misrepresented the pro-
gram's legality, but again denied
responsibility for renegade bro-
kers. The supreme court rejected
Santa Rosa's claim as meritless
and found the misrepresentations
traceable directly to Santa Rosa's
broker training materials. For ex-
ample, in a document entitled
"Questions Most Frequently
Asked About The Santa Rosa
Plan," the first question on the
document was "1. Q. Is this plan
legal? A. Yes!" However, Santa
Rosa made no attempt to deter-
mine whether its program was in
compliance with Iowa law until
four months after Santa Rosa sales
began. As a result of these misrep-
resentations, the Iowa Supreme
Court found Santa Rosa liable for
violating the state's Consumer
Fraud Act.
Remaining Issues
The supreme court partially re-
versed the trial court and held that
violations of the Door-to-Door
Sales Act and lottery statute were
not unfair practices as defined by
the Iowa consumer fraud statute.
The court reasoned that the legisla-
ture's failure to include violations
of the Act or lottery statute as
unfair practices revealed an intent
to exclude them.
Next, Santa Rosa argued that
since the restitution fund was de-
signed solely to reimburse Iowa
residents who made purchases
from Santa Rosa, the trial court
erred when it awarded the un-
claimed balance to the Iowa Con-
sumer Education and Litigation
Fund. The supreme court agreed
and directed the trial court on
remand to return any undistribut-
ed portion of the restitution fund
to Santa Rosa.
The court then turned to the
imposition of the civil penalty.
Santa Rosa contended that no pen-
alty should have been awarded
because renegade brokers violated
the law without Santa Rosa's con-
sent or encouragement. The su-
preme court concluded that Santa
Rosa impliedly authorized and en-
couraged the ideas and sales tech-
niques used by the brokers and
therefore, the civil penalty was
appropriate.
Next, the court examined the
personal liability of Santa Rosa's
owner, Groeschel. The supreme
court upheld the trial court finding
that Groeschel's liability arose as a
consequence of his complete con-
trol of Santa Rosa and his own
personal acts in perpetrating con-
sumer fraud.
Lastly, the supreme court held
that the award of prejudgment
interest was improper because the
state legislature intended to ex-
clude prejudgment interest from
the definition of restitution in the
consumer fraud statute.
Judy Koehler
Negligent Termite
Inspector Can Be Liable
To Forseeable
Subsequent Home
Purchasers
In Hosford v. State Termite and
Pest Control, Inc., 589 So. 2d 108
(Miss. 1991), the Supreme Court of
Mississippi held that a pest control
operator, who negligently inspect-
ed residential property in the pro-
cess of being sold, may be liable to
forseeable subsequent purchasers
of the house.
Background
In 1986, Jim and Judy Hosford
("the Hosfords") hired McCrary
Real Estate, Inc. in an effort to buy
a home in Columbus, Mississippi.
On July 11, 1986, the Hosfords,
through the services of McCrary
Real Estate, agreed to purchase a
house and received the corre-
sponding warranty deed. For pro-
cedural purposes, title first was
transferred to Johnny Mack
McCrary ("McCrary"), principal
in McCrary Real Estate, who then
transferred the property to the
Hosfords.
Before the closing, McCrary con-
tacted State Termite and Pest Con-
trol, Inc. ("State Termite") and
requested an inspection of the prop-
erty for possible termite damage.
Steve McKissack ("the Inspector"),
a pest control specialist employed
by State Termite, performed an
inspection of the premises and pre-
pared a report stating the results.
The report listed Charles Smith as
the current owner of the property
and McCrary, individually, as the
purchaser. The report was one of
the documents submitted at the
closing of the property purchase in
July, 1986.
The Inspector's report stated
that there was no infestation or
damage from wood-destroying in-
sects on the property. The inspec-
tion covered the readily accessible
areas of the property, but did not
include areas that were obstructed
or inaccessible at the time of in-
spection. The report also stated
that it was not a structural damage
report nor a warranty as to the
absence of wood-destroying in-
sects.
In January, 1988, nineteen
months after the inspection, Jim
Hosford noticed conditions sug-
gesting termite infestation and
damage. He had the property in-
spected by a carpenter and, later,
by two employees of the Pest Con-
trol Section of the United States
Department of Agriculture. These
parties reported substantial ter-
mite infestation and damage that
had existed for more than two
years and possibly as long as fifteen
years. The parties also agreed that
the damage should have been dis-
covered if the recent, June, 1986
inspection by State Termite had
been performed competently.
(continued on page 68)
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The Hosfords consequently sued
State Termite and the Inspector
alleging negligence and several oth-
er theories of recovery.
Circuit Court Proceedings
In the Circuit Court of Lowndes
County, Mississippi, State Termite
did not deny that a pest control
operator is held to a duty of reason-
able care similar to that imposed
upon anyone providing expert or
specialized services to the public.
Rather, State Termite claimed
there was no contract between
State Termite and the Hosfords,
and therefore, the Hosfords had no
basis for their suit. The circuit
court agreed. State Termite had
contracted with McCrary and
therefore the Hosfords lacked priv-
ity of contract. Further, the court
ruled that State Termite could not
have foreseen that the Hosfords
would rely on the inspection re-
port. The circuit court granted
summary judgment for State Ter-
mite and the Inspector and dis-
missed the complaint. The Hos-
fords appealed to the Supreme
Court of Mississippi.
Privity of Contract
The Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi rejected State Termite's lack
of privity of contract argument.
The court looked to a state statute
in which the Mississippi Legisla-
ture had declared that privity of
contract would not be a prerequi-
site to any suit for personal injury,
property damage, or economic loss
brought under negligence, strict
liability, or breach of warranty.
Miss. Code Ann. 11-7-20 (1991).
Because the Hosford's action
against State Termite alleged negli-
gence, there was no legal conse-
quence to the fact that the Hos-
fords did not have a contract with
State Termite. Thus, State Termite
could not assert lack of privity of
contract as a defense.
Foreseeability
The Mississippi Supreme Court
also rejected State Termite's de-
fense of lack of foreseeability. The
court looked to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts 552 (1977) which
states that one who, in the course
of business, supplies false informa-
tion due to a failure to exercise
reasonable care or competence in
obtaining or communicating the
information is liable to those who
justifiably rely upon the informa-
tion in their business transactions.
However, under the Restatement,
the supplier of false information is
only liable to those whom he
knows will use the information.
The court also cited an analogous
case that extended liability to those
whom the supplier knows or rea-
sonably should know will use the
information. Therefore, the fact
that McCrary, and not the Hos-
ANNOUNCEMENT
The Loyola Consumer
Law Reporter is currently
accepting lead articles
and feature columns for
publication in upcoming
issues. The Reporter pub-
lishes articles by prac-
titioners, scholars and
consumer experts that ex-
plore in depth legal devel-
opments affecting
consumers. Upcoming
articles will address in-
surance issues for CER-
CLA claims and steps
consumers can take to
avoid environmental lia-
bility when purchasing
real estate.
If you are interested in
submitting an article to
the Reporter please con-
tact the Chief Lead Arti-
cles Editor, Loyola
Consumer Law Reporter,
Loyola University Chi-
cago School of Law, One
East Pearson Street, Chi-
cago, Illinois 60611,
(312) 915-7181.
fords, requested the termite in-
spection was not decisive.
Because the record clearly re-
flected that McCrary bought and
sold houses professionally, the
court charged State Termite with
inferential knowledge that
McCrary was not planning to live
in the house but would probably
use the termite inspection report in
connection with the sale of the
house to another. Thus, the court
found that both State Temite and
the Inspector reasonably should
have foreseen that McCrary's im-
mediate purchaser would obtain
and rely on the inspection report.
In fact, the Hosfords did receive
the report shortly after it was is-
sued and did rely on its accurate-
ness in purchasing the house.
Therefore, the Mississippi Su-
preme Court reversed the circuit
court's decision and remanded the
case for further proceedings.
Daniel Hynes
Consumer Reliance On
Statements About
Pre-Existing Condition
Coverage Creates
Potential Liability For
Insurance Company
In Peek v. Reserve National In-
surance Company, 585 So. 2d 1303
(Ala. 1991), the Supreme Court of
Alabama held that an insurance
company could be liable for breach
of contract and fraudulent misrep-
resentation when consumers relied
on an insurance agent's statements
about pre-existing condition cover-
age and the company later refused
to pay the claim. The court also
held, however, that the insurance
company did not act in bad faith.
Background
On September 3, 1985, Rayburn
and Eve Peek ("the Peeks") met
with Lee Porter, Jr. ("Porter"), an
agent of Reserve National Insur-
ance Company ("Reserve Nation-
al"), to purchase major medical
health insurance for their family.
At that time, the Peeks disclosed to
Porter that their daughter had pre-
viously suffered menstrual difficul-
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